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Abstract: It is commonly assumed that besides knowledge of facts or truths, there is also 
knowledge of things–for example, we say that we know people or know places. We could 
call this "objectual knowledge". In this paper, I raise doubts about the idea that there is a sui 
generis objectual knowledge that is distinct from knowledge of truths.
1. Kinds of knowledge
The Western philosophical tradition has focused on knowledge of truths as the central and 
paradigmatic case of knowledge. Here is a typical first sentence of an introduction to a book on 
epistemology:
Epistemology is the theory of episteme, of knowledge. Ever since Plato it has been thought that 
one knows only if one’s belief hits the mark of truth and does so with adequate justification. 
(Bonjour and Sosa 2003, 1)
Occasionally, before launching into the discussion of knowledge of truths, treatises on epistemology
mention other kinds of knowledge. Again, the following characterization is typical:
It is common in epistemology to distinguish among three kinds of knowledge. Thereʼs the kind 
of knowledge you have when it is truly said of you that you know how to do something—say, 
ride a bicycle. Thereʼs the kind of knowledge you have when it is truly said of you that you 
know a person—say, your best friend. And thereʼs the kind of knowledge you have when it is 
truly said of you that you know that some fact is true—say, that the Red Sox won the 2004 
World Series. (Fantl 2016)
I am going to call the three kinds of knowledge mentioned here practical, objectual, and factual or 
propositional knowledge. Since it has been in the center of attention, our understanding of factual 
knowledge is quite advanced. Factual knowledge, on virtually everyoneʼs opinion, is a specific kind
of possession of a truth. A few further ideas are widely accepted as well (though each have a few 
dissenters). Possessing a truth means to have a mental attitude towards something that can be true or
false, usually regarded to be a proposition. According to many, the mental attitude in question is a 
belief, but true belief is not sufficient for knowledge, there are further conditions: justification, or 
production by a reliable process, or by a cognitive ability or intellectual virtue, integration into an 
agentʼs cognitive character, a modal condition of “safety” or “sensitivity”, and so on. One function 
of these further conditions is to exclude a merely accidental or lucky possession of truth which is 
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deemed to be incompatible with knowledge. On a somewhat different view, the relevant mental 
attitude towards a truth is not belief, but rather the mental attitude of knowing. Having this attitude 
excludes a merely lucky possession of truth by itself. So on a widely accepted conception, factual 
knowledge is at least a non-accidental possession of a truth (and possibly more).
The nature of practical knowledge has been the subject of some debate. On the so-called 
intellectualist view, practical knowledge is a sub-category of factual knowledge (Stanley and 
Williamson 2001). According to the opposing, anti-intellectualist view–influentially defended by 
Gilbert Ryle (1949), among others–practical knowledge is not a species of factual knowledge, but 
rather some sort of ability or disposition to successfully perform a certain action. However, a 
plausible anti-intellectualist account of practical knowledge will make it clear why it is a species of 
knowledge. Presumably, defenders of the intellectualist view donʼt want to deny that that we can 
meaningfully talk about abilities to perform actions; what they deny is that these abilities constitute 
knowing how to do something. So the anti-intellectualist should be able to explain what is common 
to factual and practical knowledge that makes them both knowledge. 
One particular version goes as follows (Farkas 2018). Knowing how to G involves the 
ability to reliably succeed in a mentally guided execution of G-ing. Factual knowledge is one kind 
of cognitive achievement. It is an achievement partly because it involves success, where the 
particular success component of factual knowledge is having a true belief. The parallel success 
component of practical knowledge is a mentally guided successful execution of a certain type of 
action. In both cases, there is a mental attitude towards some content that is typical of the piece of 
knowledge in question. In neither case can the success be a matter of mere accident or luck. Some 
further conditions make sure that the success is non-lucky. So both factual and practical knowledge 
are at least non-lucky cognitive achievements (and possibly more).
.  
2. Objectual knowledge–a third kind?
On the conceptions sketched in the previous section, both factual and practical knowledge form a 
proper kind. Knowing different types of facts–eg. perceptual or mathematical, past or present, 
modal or actual–may have quite different conditions, but still, all instances of factual knowledge 
share a nature, in being some sort of non-accidental possession of a truth. Similarly, instances of 
practical knowledge–both on the intellectualist and anti-intellectualist account–share a certain 
nature. And since both kinds are properly regarded as knowledge, it looks like we have a genus–
knowledge–with two species (or with a sub-species): factual and practical
Let us turn now to objectual knowledge, which is the subject of this paper. I think it is fair to
say that our understanding of objectual knowledge, as a kind, lags behind our understanding of 
factual and practical knowledge. There have been attempts to analyse some sub-categories of 
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objectual knowledge: knowing persons, or knowing experiences, for example. But it is hard to find 
detailed competing analyses of objectual knowledge as a general category. As we shall see, the few 
existing accounts tend to rely on the notion of acquaintance: itʼs been suggested that on a suitably 
defined philosophical concept, the relation of acquaintance constitutes objectual knowledge.
If we follow the logic of the quote above, then we should expect objectual knowledge to be 
a third species in the genus of knowledge. This would mean, first, that objectual knowledge is in 
some sense the same with respect to different types of objects, and second, that it shares something 
with the other two kinds of knowledge. Further, similarly to practical knowledge, objectual 
knowledge is potentially irreducible to factual knowledge, forming a genuine separate kind. 
In this paper, I will try to raise doubts about this picture. First, I will argue that if objectual 
knowledge is expressed by our usual talk of “knowing things”, then it is not a proper kind with a 
uniform nature: the relation that constitutes thing-knowledge is quite different for different types of 
things. Knowing a person, knowing a place, knowing our rights and knowing feelings are all quite 
different relations. Second, I will question that “knowledge of things” is a recognisable member of 
the genus knowledge: if we agree that factual knowledge is the central and paradigmatic case of 
knowledge, then at least some of the relations denoted by “knowing things” are not usefully 
classified as knowledge that forms the subject matter of epistemology. Knowing a person, in 
particular, consists at least partly of a relation that is not a cognitive achievement. I do have some 
sympathy for the third assumption: at least some types of knowledge of things, though involve and 
enable factual knowledge, are not reducible to it. However, itʼs precisely the irreducible aspect that 
arguably places these relations outside the genus that includes factual and practical knowledge. 
I will conclude this paper by suggesting that the most promising direction to develop an 
account of sui generis objectual knowledge is to depart from the ordinary ascriptions of “knowing 
things” and rely on a philosophical notion of acquaintance. The range of things that can be known 
objectually will be limited to the kind of things with which we can be acquainted–for example, to 
features of conscious experiences. But a lot of further work will be needed to show that this relation
is usefully classified together with factual and practical knowledge as a third kind.
3. Knowledge by acquaintance and description
Contemporary discussions of objectual knowledge often invoke Bertrand Russellʼs distinction 
between „knowledge by acquaintance” and „knowledge by description” (Russell 1910 and 1912). 
Russell has probably done more than anyone to muddy waters in this area, so before we start our 
discussion, we will do well by trying to clear up some of the confusions connected to his work.
In The Problems of Philosophy, towards the end of the chapter on Idealism, Russell 
introduces a distinction between two senses of the word „know”: one applies to knowledge of 
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truths, and the other to knowledge of things. He notes that the distinction roughly corresponds to the
distinction between the German wissen and kennen, or the French savoir and connaître. The next 
chapter is devoted exclusively to knowledge of things, which, in turn, falls into two categories: 
knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description (also the title of that chapter). So on 
Russellʼs classification, knowledge by description is a subcategory of knowledge of things, rather 
than knowledge of truths. But itʼs clear from the examples he gives that much (or all) of knowledge 
by description is factual knowledge, rather than sui generis objectual knowledge. A more promising
direction for our current purposes is to ask whether Russellʼs “knowledge by acquaintance” is sui 
generis objectual knowledge. Indeed it is quite common in contemporary discussions to equate 
knowledge by acquaintance with objectual knowledge (eg Zagzebski 1999, Martens 2010) 
Russell characterises the difference between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by 
description as a difference in their ground: knowledge by acquaintance is “logically independent 
from any knowledge of truths”, while knowledge by description “always involves (...) some 
knowledge of truths as its source and ground.” (Rusell 1912, 19) On Russellʼs view, acquaintance is
a direct awareness of an object, without the mediation of inference or knowledge of truths. His 
primary example of acquaintance is our awareness of sense-data. It can be debated whether there is 
such a cognitive relation, and whether we are acquainted only with sense-data or possibly with other
kinds of objects. But suppose there is such a relation; what is „knowledge by acquaintance” as 
opposed to mere „acquaintance”? Or are these perhaps the same? In other words, is being 
acquainted with something a form of knowledge in itself? 
Some people deny this. John M. DePoe claims that direct acquaintance never suffices for 
knowledge; knowledge by acquaintance, like all knowledge, is knowledge of truths, and its 
distinguishing feature is that itʼs based on being acquainted with something (DePoe 2013). Richard 
Fumerton and Ali Hasan think that Russell probably „equivocates between the relation of 
acquaintance and the special kind of knowledge of truth (foundational knowledge) whose sole 
source is acquaintance” (Hasan and Fumerton 2014). To avoid confusion, they propose to restrict 
knowledge by acquaintance to foundational knowledge of truths.
Knowledge by acquaintance, that is, knowledge of truths based on acquaintance is an 
interesting topic that raises a number of important questions, but I want to put it aside for the 
moment because itʼs not our central concern. My interest here is whether there is separate kind of 
knowledge which relates to things rather than to truths. Itʼs not clear to me whether Russell is after 
such a knowledge. Clarifying this issue would require a closer look at the relevant passages, 
something I have no space to do here. If acquaintance is the key to objectual knowledge, I propose 
to consult others on this issue who address this point much more clearly and explicitly than Russell 
does (see section 9 below). 
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Before we move on, let me note another unhelpful idea put forward by Russell. In the paper 
“Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description” (Russell 1910), Russell introduces 
the contrast between the two types of knowledge by talking of a case where “we know propositions 
about "the so-and-so" without knowing who or what the so-and-so is” (Russell 1910, 108). In these 
cases, he says, the subject is merely described. In the subsequent discussion, knowledge by (mere) 
description is again contrasted with knowing who or what someone or something is (Russell 1910, 
113). It looks like Russell equates knowledge by acquaintance with cases of “knowing who” or 
“knowing what”.  This isnʼt a course worth following. As we shall see below, for example 
“knowing who” is most plausibly a form of factual knowledge, and it clearly comes apart from 
ordinary cases of knowing someone. I know who Maryam Mirzakhani was (a mathematician, so far 
the only female winner of the Fields-medal), but I didnʼt know her. The usual sense of “knowing 
what” arguably also comes apart from Russellʼs special sense of knowing something by 
acquaintance. I could know what you are experiencing at the moment–the taste of Marmite–without
being acquainted with the taste of Marmite. So I propose to steer clear of Russellʼs discussion of the
matter.
4. The language of knowledge ascriptions
The following should be uncontroversial: when we gain knowledge about portions of the world, we 
enter into all sorts of interesting relationships to the things that are included in that portion. Facts 
have things as constituents, and for example when we have a perceptual knowledge of a fact, we 
commonly perceive the things that constitute that fact. But this observation does not require 
postulating a third kind of knowledge. It would require a significant further argument to show that 
knowledge of things is more than, or different from, knowing facts about them. 
So why think that there is objectual knowledge? An initial motivation may come from the 
linguistic constructions we use to attribute knowledge. Factual knowledge is often attributed by 
using that-clauses, as in 
(1) Isaac knows that apples fall to the ground.
This may be contrasted with attributions where the verb „know” is combined with a noun phrase (or
„NP” for short), as in the following examples:
(2) René knows Marin.
(3) Federico knows Rome.
(4) Meno knows the way to Larissa.
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(5) Endre knows some good cafés in Budapest.
In (1), it looks like the object of knowledge is the true proposition that apples fall to the ground. On 
some accounts, knowledge is not a relation to a proposition, but to a fact, where a fact is understood
to be more than a true proposition. This detail will not matter for our discussion: the important thing
is that on the central notion of knowledge, knowledge aims at a truth, or something that bears an 
essential relation to a truth, like a truthmaker. (I will omit this qualification from now on, but it 
should be understood implicitly.) The question I ask in this paper is whether there is a distinct type 
of knowledge whose object is not a truth, but rather a thing (or some things). In examples (2)-(5), 
the apparent object of knowledge is not a proposition or fact, but a person, a city, a way, and some 
cafes.
When the distinction between knowing facts and knowing things is introduced, it is often 
noted that in a number of languages other than English, “know” is translated by two different 
words. For example, German distinguishes between „wissen” and „kennen”, French between 
„savoir” and „connaître”, and Hungarian between „tudni” and „ismerni”. In each case, the second of
the pairs is used to translate (2) and (3), and at least some occurrences of (4) and (5) above. 
This phenomenon seems to lend immediate, if somewhat superficial support to my 
previously mentioned claim that there is no common genus for factual and objectual knowledge. 
The support is superficial, because it is possible that English has a classificatory insight here that 
other languages lack. And as Edward Craig notes (Craig 1990, 140 ff) English is not the only 
language using one word for these two concepts; Craig reports having heard the same about a 
handful of Asian and African languages, and we may add Russian as another example (while 
interestingly, Russian has a separate verb for knowing how). In addition, Craig recalls that in 
several languages (including German and Hungarian), the word for “theory of knowledge” is in fact
related to the second of the words in the pairs mentioned above, the one thatʼs used to express a 
relation to things. The French word for “knowledge” is “conaissance”. Hence Craig reasonably 
claims that the second, object-oriented sense of “know” seems to be somehow related to the first, 
and it would be a desirable feature of a theory of knowledge if it could account for this connection. I
agree with this, and I will hopefully offer such an explanation (not dissimilar to the explanation 
offered by Craig). But I will claim that the relation between the two kinds is less straightforward 
than belonging to the same genus.
5. The non-acquaintance sense of “know + noun phrase” constructions
We often attribute knowledge in English by using a “know + noun phrase” (know-NP) construction,
as we saw in the examples (2)-(5) above. The common grammatical form covers some important 
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differences. Reneʼs knowing Marin, or Federicoʼs knowing Rome are most plausibly understood as 
some sort of familiarity or acquaintance. But not all know-NP constructions express the kind of 
acquaintance that figures in these two sentences. For example, consider the sentence “Meno knows 
the way to Larissa”. On one understanding, this does mean that Meno is acquainted with the road: 
presumably, he has travelled to Larissa, he is familiar with the roadʼs various features. However, the
same sentence can be perfectly well applied even if Meno has never been on the road, but merely 
knows which is the way to Larissa, under some appropriate description. Imagine that Meno is about
to set off to Larissa for the first time in his life, after carefully studying and memorising the 
directions. If someone is wondering how Meno will get to Larissa, we can reassure her that heʼll be 
fine, he knows the way. The same ambiguity is present in many other noun phrase attributions. (5) 
could imply that Endre has been to the cafés in question, but it is also applicable if Endre has never 
been to Budapest, and just learned the names of the places from a guide book.2
On one plausible proposal, the non-acquaintance reading of many of these sentences can be 
reformulated: Meno knows the way to Larissa just in case he knows which way leads to Larissa. 
This directs our attention to another group of attributions: know-wh attributions. These combine the
verb “know” with a so-called “wh-clause” containing an implicit question, as in the following 
examples:
(6) Cain knows where his brother is.
(7) Eve knows which fruit is forbidden.
According to the standard analysis, someone knows-wh only if she knows a/the proposition that 
answers the question implicit in the wh-clause. There may be additional conditions for sufficiency, 
but even if there are, know-wh is basically a type of propositional knowledge. Thus (7) is true 
because Eve knows that the apple from the tree of knowledge is forbidden, and this answers the 
question “Which fruit is forbidden?”3
The proposal I just considered is that the non-acquaintance sense of know-NP attributions is 
equivalent to a know-wh attribution4. Know-wh, in turn, is the same as (a possibly special kind of) 
propositional knowledge. Suppose that Meno knows that the E75 leads from Athens to Larissa; 
2 In Hungarian, the non-acquaintance and the acquaintance senses of know-NP attributions are often translated by the
two different verbs that correspond to “know” (“tud/ismer” as mentioned above; “Menón tudja az utat” / “Menón 
ismeri az utat”). As I understand, German is somewhat similar, at least for some objects, so “Menon weiss den 
Weg” and “Menon kenne den Weg” are both well-formed, and while the second implies acquaintance, the first 
doesnʼt. In French, “savoir” (the non-acquaintance senses of knowledge) does not naturally take noun-phrases 
(except for poetic contexts); in French, the natural translation of the non-acquaintance sense of a know-NP sentence
is a know-wh sentence.
3 For a more detailed discussion of know-wh and for some proposals to refine the standard analysis, see Farkas 2016 
and Farkas 2017.
4 See Brogaard 2009 for a discussion and defense of a similar view for “know-the” and “know-a” attributions.
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since this answers the question “Which way leads to Larissa?”, Meno knows which way leads to 
Larissa is, which is equivalent to his knowing the way to Larissa. So the non-acquaintance sense of 
know-NP is equivalent to some sort of propositional (factual) knowledge.
I suggested the outlines of an analysis for some knowledge-NP attributions via an analysis 
of know-wh attributions. It also makes sense to proceed the other way around. Many know-wh 
attributions are easily converted into a know-NP format, for example (6) can be converted to:
(6ʼ) Cain knows the whereabouts of his brother.
A plausible analysis for know-the sentences: S knows the F only if, for some x, she knows that x is 
the F. Other quantified phrases follow a similar pattern, and additional conditions may be required 
for sufficiency. Then we can proceed to give this analysis for the equivalent know-wh sentence. On 
either way of proceeding, we find that that the core of both knowledge-wh and a lot of knowledge-
NP is knowledge of propositions.
If the states attributed by many know-wh and know-NP sentences are in fact states of 
propositional knowledge, one may wonder why we have these other forms of attribution at all. 
There are good reasons: both forms have functions that know-that attributions cannot serve. First, 
one can attribute knowledge by using know-wh and know-NP even if she herself is ignorant of the 
matter. Someone who doesnʼt know the way to Larissa can still claim that Meno does. Know-wh 
and know-NP can also be used to attribute knowledge to a person over a changing subject matter, 
where factual attributions would require specifying many distinct propositions; for example, in 
saying that Kate always knows (what) the latest fashion (is). Both uses are made possible by the fact
that neither know-wh nor know-NP constructions identify explicitly a propositional object in their 
content–even if they are in fact made true by knowing a proposition.
To sum up this section: some cases of knowing the Fs or knowing some Fs are best 
understood as cases of know-wh, which, in turn, are best understood as some kind of propositional 
knowledge. What suffices for “knowing who” or “knowing which” is a highly context-dependent 
matter. For example, there doesnʼt seem to be a privileged list of propositions about a person whose
knowledge would be either necessary or sufficient for knowing who that person is, in all contexts. 
But even if we cannot generally single out these propositions, in each context, knowing who 
someone is will simply consist in knowing some propositions. If all thing-related knowledge was 
like this, then there would be no sui generis objectual knowledge. So we need to search further.
6. Knowledge in the biblical sense
Within the category of knowledge of things, certain kinds of entities have received particular 
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attention: for example, knowledge of sensory or mental items, knowledge of the self, or knowledge 
of persons. However, in my readings in epistemology, I havenʼt yet come across a proper discussion
of one sense or type of knowledge: knowledge in the biblical sense. What explains this glaring 
omission, and what should we do about it? One option would be to try to work out an analysis of 
this type of knowledge. Following a current trend, we could design a few vignettes, which all had 
labels printed in small capitals, like EDEN: 
EDEN. Adam and Eve were the first man and woman. They were expelled from the garden of
Eden. Adam had sex with Eve, and Eve had a child.
We could remark that intuitively, in EDEN, Adam knew Eve in the biblical sense. On the basis of 
this and other cases, we could suggest necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge in the 
biblical sense (henceforth knowledgeB):
INTERCOURSE. S knewB  Z iff S had sex with Z.
We could then wonder if knowledgeB was symmetrical. We could remark on the episodic nature of  
knowledgeB, and contrast it with the static nature of other kinds of knowledge. We could refine 
INTERCOURSE in response to certain objections raised by Reviewer 2, clarifying that not every form 
of sex is sufficient for knowledgeB. We could consider looking at the issue from a feminist 
perspective.
Tempting as it is, this isnʼt the response I suggest. While knowledgeB is clearly an important 
relation, and its study raises many interesting issues, I donʼt think itʼs a useful category for the 
theory of knowledge. Admittedly, it is not a complete coincidence that we use the term 
‟knowledge” in these contexts: one possible explanation is that knowledgeB of someone plausibly 
produces factual (and practical) knowledge of the more familiar kind. Nonetheless, it doesnʼt seem 
that the relation of knowledgeB itself is a sui generis type of knowledge in the sense that matters for 
epistemology. 
I claim that objectual knowledge is similar to knowledge in the biblical sense at least in the 
following respect: there are various forms of objectual knowledge that pick out important relations, 
and standing in these relations to things can well lead to the production of knowledge. But none of 
these relations themselves, nor all of them together, form a sui generis type of knowledge in the 
sense that matters for epistemology. This sense will of course need to be explained.
7. Knowing people
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One of the central cases of objectual knowledge is knowledge of persons; all discussions of this 
topic that I have seen include an example of knowing a person. (Witness the quote in the first 
section, and the quotes in section 9). What are the conditions for knowing someone? As a first 
approximation, we know people whom we have met (possibly a few times). Meeting someone 
involves mutual recognition of subjects as particular individuals. A similar thought is expressed by 
the Oxford English Dictionary which gives the primary meaning of “Know [with object]” as 
follows: “Have developed a relationship with (someone) through meeting and spending time with 
them; be familiar or friendly with.” (Stevenson 2010, 975) 
Philosophers will want to unpack these conditions further. Matthew Benton offers a 
plausible and carefully argued analysis of knowing people. Benton argues that the following is a 
necessary condition for “interpersonal knowledge” (knowledgei) 
ENCOUNTER: S knowsi R only if (i) S has had reciprocal causal contact with R, in which (ii) S 
treats R second personally, and (iii) R treats S second-personally. (Benton 2017, 822)
Elaborating on this, Benton writes:
A treatment by a subject S toward its recipient R is second-personal in virtue of S treating R 
as a subject (a “you”), where S offers some of S’s own thoughts, words, or emotions to R, 
and S is, or for the most part intends to be, attentive to R’s thoughts, words, or emotions. 
(Benton 2017, 822)
This analysis accords with the Oxford English Dictionary definition. The condition of reciprocal 
causal contact is more flexible than the condition of meeting and spending time with someone; it 
allows for less direct forms of contact. Bentonʼs analysis is also much more informative on the kind 
of relationship that develops between people who know each other, by appealing to the idea of 
second-person treatment.
On this conception, knowing persons is a symmetrical relationship: we know people who 
know us. It may be objected that we regularly talk about knowing people even if the knowledge is 
one-sided. Someone could claim “I know that woman, she lives next door” after spotting her on a 
photograph, even if they havenʼt met. As a turn of phrase, a political commentator could say “I 
know the president, she would never consent to this” even if they never met. In these cases, the 
knowledge in question plausibly consists in knowing relevant information about a person. I donʼt 
want to deny that on some occasions, this is how we talk. But I do think that the central and primary
meaning of knowing someone is the one that implies personal interaction. In both of the cases just 
mentioned, it would make sense to ask: “I didnʼt realise you know her; when did you meet?”, and 
expect them to back down by clarifying that they donʼt know her personally, just know who she is, 
or what she is like.   
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Knowing someone produces propositional knowledge of the known person, and without 
some such knowledge gained, we would be reluctant to say that the subject knows the other (Crane 
2012). But while knowing someone involves propositional knowledge, it has been argued that it is 
not reducible to propositional knowledge. This has been stated briefly for example by Ernest Sosa. 
The reason he gives for this irreducibility is that “(k)nowing someone or something, knowing some 
“object” in the broadest sense of this term, seems at least sometimes to require having had some 
special causal interaction with that “object.”” (Bonjour and Sosa 2003, 100). Benton expresses a 
similar idea: “I … locate the irreducibility of interpersonal knowing in the two-way interactions 
characteristic of two subjects treating each other as subjects”. (Benton 2017, 823)
The idea needs elaboration. In a sense, some types of factual knowledge ‟require a special 
causal interaction” with an object. For example, it is a necessary condition for having perceptual 
knowledge that a subject perceives, or has perceived an object; otherwise the knowledge wouldnʼt 
be perceptual (that is, produced or justified by perception.) Perception, in turn, involves a certain 
causal interaction between an object and a subject. Seeing something involves an object visually 
stimulating the perceptual system of a perceiving subject, and visual stimulation is a causal process.
That such a causal process is required by, or involved in, perceiving an object, can (and should) be 
admitted even by those who think that perception cannot be reductively analysed in causal terms. 
One could argue that the knowledge relation itself doesnʼt involve causation–itʼs only its production
or justification that does. But since a certain type of production or justification is essential for this 
type of knowledge, there will be still some sense in which knowledge ‟requires” a causal interaction
with its object.  Another interesting comparison is with testimonial knowledge, which requires a 
certain kind of interaction with another subject. 
Perceptual knowledge and testimonial knowledge thus arguably “require” a specific kind of 
causal interaction with an object or with another subject, yet they are cases of propositional 
knowledge. Hence someone who wanted to argue for a reduction could push back in response to 
Sosaʼs and Bentonʼs observations, by suggesting that knowing a person is simply propositional 
knowledge that is produced through a certain type of causal interaction, or justified in virtue of 
standing in a causal relation to an object. In other words, it is structurally similar to knowledge by 
acquaintance, as discussed in the previous section. (On a certain notion of acquaintance, it would 
not be merely similar to, but also an actual case of, knowledge by acquaintance). I do not think this 
is quite right, but I wonʼt try to present a conclusive argument against such a reduction. Instead, I 
will split my argument into two strands. My overall claim is that there is no sui generis objectual 
knowledge which is both distinct from factual knowledge and also recognisably a member of the 
same genus “knowledge”. If you think that interpersonal knowledge is reducible to propositional 
knowledge, youʼll agree with the conclusion. If you think that interpersonal knowledge is not 
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reducible to propositional knowledge, I will try to show that the aspect that makes it irreducible also
places it outside the genus of knowledge. Either way, the overall conclusion is supported.
So why would someone think–plausibly, in my view–that the requirement of a specific 
causal interaction makes interpersonal knowledge irreducible to factual knowledge (rather than just 
qualify its production)? The beginning of the answer is that the interactions are important because 
they produce and sustain not only propositional knowledge in each of the participants, but also an 
interpersonal relationship between them (as suggested by the Oxford Dictionary entry). Other 
examples of interpersonal relationships that are similarly produced include friendship, being lovers, 
being accomplices or allies in a shared project.5 Indeed interpersonal knowledge seems to be the 
precondition of all other similar interpersonal relationships. 
Iʼd like to suggest that we are reluctant to regard this basic interpersonal knowledge as 
reducible to propositional knowledge because it has a non-cognitive aspect. Let us approach this 
first by reflecting on friendship. Pretty much all accounts agree that friendship requires that friends 
have the attitude of caring towards each other. This is an attitude that lies beyond the realm of 
cognitive achievements: itʼs a social or emotional attitude towards another. I propose that a less 
demanding but equally non-cognitive attitude is constitutive of interpersonal knowing: to use 
Bentonʼs terms, it is the attitude of considering another subject as a subject. This is not simply 
representing the other as a subject of certain kinds of mental states: it is an attitude that takes in or 
recognises the other, and is the basis of developing further interpersonal attitudes like care, trust or 
love.
Imagine a subject who has highly developed cognitive capacities, but is very deficient in 
social and emotional aspects. I donʼt think this person can consider someone as a subject, and hence
get to know another the way we do. If you disagree with this, if purely cognitive systems can know 
each other, then I return to the first strand of this argument: I challenge you to point at something 
that these systems have that is not propositional knowledge (produced in a certain way) but 
constitutes their knowing each other.
I started the paper by noting that the paradigm of knowledge in our philosophical tradition is
factual knowledge. This determines the genus of knowledge as some kind of cognitive achievement,
and if whatʼs been said above is right, given that interpersonal knowledge has an essential non-
cognitive aspect, this places it outside the genus of knowledge so understood. ENCOUNTER will turn 
out to be similar to INTERCOURSE, insofar as it specifies a relation that is not reducible to 
propositional knowledge, but lies outside the central concerns of epistemology. At the same time, it 
is a relationship that tends to produce propositional (and possibly practical) knowledge in the relata,
5 Benton also notes that “Through personal encounters, people can progress from being mere 
acquaintances to being friends, to close friends, to intimates or lovers” (2017, 823)
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and this explains its connection to knowledge in the paradigmatic sense.
8. Knowing places, facts, rights, experiences
In addition to knowing persons, knowing places is also frequently mentioned as an example of 
knowing things. Knowing places seems to share with knowing persons the feature that a special 
kind of causal interaction is required with the object. In order to know Budapest, one had to be 
there, for an extended times or several times, and plausibly, one also has to be able to get around at 
least to some extent. In this case, it is less clear than in the case of interpersonal knowledge that 
anything beyond factual and practical knowledge is required. As proposed before, in this case it is 
an additional condition that the factual knowledge has to be produced in a certain way, namely, 
through repeated personal interactions. 
 Objectual knowledge attributions can take all sorts of objects, and in the case of some kind 
of objects, the knowledge is straightforwardly propositional, and there is no restriction on the 
production of knowledge. The most obvious case is knowledge of facts, or knowledge of the truth. 
(I have in mind attributions which would be translated by “connaître” and “kennen” and so on). 
Knowing a fact is factual knowledge. The same holds for some other kinds of objects; for example, 
knowing your rights, or knowing the rules, or knowing a theory, all plausibly consist in knowing 
some propositions, however that knowledge is produced. These are clearly quite different relations 
from the relation of interpersonal knowledge, and also different from knowing a place (which has to
have a specific mode of production). Yet there is no obvious argument to exclude them from the 
instances of objectual knowledge. This suggests that the relation of “knowing an object” is different
when it comes to different types of objects. Next I will consider yet another type of object where the
relation is again arguably different.
A frequently mentioned example of knowing things is knowledge of experiences. Sosa 
mentions knowing “the experience of a cold shower after a hard run” (Bonjour and Sosa 2003, 100),
and the two philosophers considered in the next section talk about knowing “the agony of defeat” 
(Conee 1994, 14) and “the joy of victory” (Tye 2009, 96). To know an experience requires that one 
has had the experience. Unlike in the case of knowing people and knowing places, there is no 
requirement of repeated interactions. It is commonly assumed that once a person feels the agony of 
defeat, she will be at least in a good position to know the agony of defeat. However, there is 
something special in this case: namely, it is often claimed that the relation we have to features of 
experience when we have the experience has some features that deserve a separate discussion.
This point leads us to the consideration of the philosophical notion of “acquaintance”. Most 
contemporary discussions trace back the notion to Russell, and as the definition in section 3 
suggests, it is commonly assumed to be a direct (non-inferential) form of awareness of an object. It 
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is also often assumed that one can have this relation only to specific type of entities, primarily of a 
mental nature–mental facts or sense-data or features of conscious experiences. Russell thought that 
in addition to sense-data, one can also be acquainted with universals, and possibly with the self, but 
he categorically denied that we can be acquainted with physical objects or with persons as far as 
they appear to us physically. So knowing oneʼs best friend is certainly not a relation of acquaintance
on Russellʼs definition. In the contemporary discussion, it is again frequently assumed that 
acquaintance is a special relationship we have to our conscious experiences; witness the following 
definition: 
Acquaintance is a unique epistemological relation that relates a person to her own 
phenomenally conscious states and processes directly, incorrigibly, and in a way that seems 
to reveal their essence. (Balog 2012)
Balog makes some assumptions which may not be accepted by everyone: that acquaintance is 
incorrigible and reveals essences. But she shares the common view that the class of objects with 
which we can be acquainted is limited.
On most accounts, acquaintance with mental items has an important role in producing 
knowledge about those items. But as we remarked earlier when discussing Russellʼs notion, this 
knowledge can be understood as propositional knowledge that is based on acquaintance, rather than
objectual knowledge which is directed at an object rather than at a truth. Here we are particularly 
interested in the suggestion that acquaintance in itself constitutes (rather than merely produces or 
justifies) objectual knowledge. The suggestion is that if one bears the relation of acquaintance to an 
object, then this is the same as knowing that object in the specific object-directed sense. I am going 
to consider two proposals along these lines in the next section.
9. Acquaintance as knowledge of things
Earl Conee and Michael Tye both suggest that acquaintance itself constitutes objectual knowledge. 
The context of both Coneeʼs and Tyeʼs discussion is the evaluation of the so-called “knowledge 
argument”. This argument is found already in Russell, and was then formulated independently by 
Howard Robinson (Robinson 1982) and Frank Jackson (1982). It concerns someone who has a 
certain type of conscious experience for the first time in their life. Tye and Conee both argue that 
the new knowledge gained on such an occasion–often characterized as knowing what itʼs like to 
have an experience–is non-propositional, objectual knowledge of (features of) the experience. In 
support of this position, they both argue that there is a general category of sui generis objectual 
knowledge. Conee claims that  “(a)cquaintance constitutes a third category of knowledge, 
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irreducible to factual knowledge or knowing how” (Conee 1994, 136.) and Tye holds that  „just as 
there is a sense of ‘see’ such that one sees an object if and only if it looks some way to one, so there
is a sense of ‘know’ such one knows a thing if and only if one is acquainted with that thing.” (Tye 
2009, 96)
Note that this position requires that instances of knowing different types of objects are all 
constituted by the same relation of acquaintance, for otherwise we donʼt have an account of a 
general sui generis objectual knowledge. Indeed, both Conee and Tye seem to accept this, as 
suggested by the following quotes:
To come to know a property is to become acquainted with the property, just as to come to 
know a city is to become acquainted with the city, and to come to know a problem is to 
become acquainted with the problem. It is uncontroversial that some knowledge attributions 
ascribe a relation of acquaintance, as when we say things like ʻSam knows Billʼ, or ʻBob 
knows the agony of defeatʼ. These considerations suggest a hypothesis about the examples 
in question to the effect that the difference between ignorance of what an experience is like 
and knowledge of what an experience is like is a matter of acquaintance. (Conee 1994,140) 
In ordinary English we talk of knowing things and knowing facts. I know Brian 
McLaughlin, for example. I know the city of Athens. I know the joy of victory and I also 
know the thrill of driving very fast. I know the feeling of anger. (Tye 2009, 95-96)
... why should consciousness of something, direct or indirect, yield knowledge of that thing?
… it is simply incoherent to suppose that one might be genuinely (noninferentially) 
conscious of an entity and yet not know it at all. In being conscious of a particular shade of 
red at a particular moment, say, I know that shade of red. How could I not? I know it just by 
being conscious of it. I may not know that shade of red a few moments later, after turning 
away; I may not know any truths about that shade of red; but, as I view the shade, know it I 
do in some ordinary, basic sense of the term ‘know’. (Tye 2009, 99)
The line of reasoning presented here seems to go as follows. First, let us take typical ordinary 
examples of knowing things, such as knowing people or places. (Both Conee and Tye have 
examples of both kinds; Conee talks of knowing Cambridge as an instance of being acquainted with
Cambridge). Second, it is uncontroversial, the argument proceeds, that there is knowledge in this 
sense; after all, we truly say that Sam knows Bill, or Cambridge, that Tye knows Brian Mclaughlin 
and Athens. Third, consider the relation of acquaintance we have to features of our conscious 
experiences: this is the same kind of relation as the relation between a subject and a person or place 
known by her. Fourth, just as the latter is uncontroversially an instance of knowledge, so is the 
former–the argument concludes.
There are two problems with this argument. One is with the third step: in fact, the relation of
acquaintance we have to conscious features is very different from the relation of knowing people in 
the ordinary sense. It is a controversial matter whether or not we can be “acquainted” with people in
the philosophical sense–that is, whether or not we can be directly aware of a person in the sense we 
are directly aware of features of experiences. Russell certainly thought that we cannot be. On a 
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different view, seeing something may count as an instance of acquaintance, and since we can see 
people, we can be acquainted with them. But even if this is right, acquaintance will still be different 
from interpersonal knowing. I see the person sitting at the next table in the cafe as I type these lines,
but I donʼt know her. Acquaintance is also going to be different from other relations of knowing 
things. It is different from the relation we have to our rights when we know them. Suppose seeing is
a type of acquaintance–seeing a place is not the same as knowing a place. I have seen a number of 
cities from the train on a journey two weeks ago, but I donʼt know these cities. So unless something 
else is said on the issue, we cannot assume that the same relation of acquaintance constitutes all the 
relations we bear to things when we are said to know them.
There is another problem with the argument, and itʼs in the second step. If what is said in 
section 7 is right, then interpersonal knowledge does not belong to the genus “knowledge” whose 
nature is determined by factual knowledge as its central case. So we cannot use interpersonal 
knowing as one of the uncontroversial examples of, and model for, objectual knowledge, if our 
purpose is to give an account of knowledge that is the subject matter of epistemology. Initially, 
knowing persons may seem like a very plausible example of “a third category of knowledge, 
irreducible to factual knowledge or knowing how”, as Conee puts it. But I argued above that this 
picture is not right. Just what makes interpersonal knowing “irreducible to factual knowledge or 
knowing how”, will also plausibly prevent it from being a “third category of knowledge”, if 
“knowledge” is used univocally.
10. Acquaintance as objectual knowledge, second try
In the previous section, I considered an attempt to use the philosophical notion of acquaintance, 
understood as direct awareness of an object, to give an account of objectual knowledge. The idea 
was that acquaintance constitutes the ordinary relation of knowing things, and since these 
uncontroversially include cases of knowledge, acquaintance itself constitutes knowledge. I had two 
complaints about this idea: first, acquaintance in the philosophical sense is quite different for 
example from the relation of knowing persons; second, “connaître” may not be “knowledge” in the 
same sense as “savoir” is knowledge.
But now note that the two problems could actually cancel out each other and hence open a 
new avenue for a theory of objectual knowledge making use of the notion of acquaintance. We 
could admit that acquaintance is quite different from the relation of interpersonal knowledge; but 
since interpersonal knowledge is not “knowledge” in the epistemic sense anyway, this isnʼt a big 
loss; in fact, it is an advantage. Next we could suggest that direct awareness of an object is 
relevantly similar to the central cases of knowledge, in being a non-accidental cognitive 
achievement. Objectual knowledge will then belong to the genus of knowledge, we just have to 
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keep in mind that ordinary attributions of know-NP, or uses of “connaître” and “kennen” most of 
the time do not ascribe “objectual knowledge” in the philosophical sense. 
Depending on the notion of acquaintance that is proposed to constitute objectual knowledge,
the range of things that can be known in this sense will be more or less restricted. If we can be 
acquainted only with features of conscious experiences, then only those can be objectually known. 
If perception also provides acquaintance with the perceived objects, then we can objectually know 
everything we can perceive, but presumably not rights or rules. And objectually knowing for 
example a person will not be the same as knowing her.
This, I believe, is the most promising avenue for developing an account of a sui generis 
objectual knowledge. But the account needs very significant further support. First, we would need 
an argument to show that knowledge constituted by acquaintance is needed in addition to (factual) 
knowledge based on acquaintance (ie. justified or produced by acquaintance). Many phenomena 
about acquaintance can be arguably explained simply by appealing to the idea of knowledge based 
on acquaintance. For example, it is often claimed that that we canʼt know what itʼs like to have a 
certain experience without having had the experience. One might think that this is explained by the 
fact that experiencing (which is the episode when one is acquainted with a phenomenal quality) is 
the same as what-itʼs-like knowledge. But thatʼs not the only possible explanation.  Suppose that 
“what-itʼs-like” knowledge is always based on acquaintance; and the only way to become 
acquainted with a phenomenal quality is to experience it. This theory would also explain the claim.
Second, even if acquaintance can be understood as a non-accidental cognitive achievement, 
this may not be sufficient for knowledge, even if it is necessary. For an example that is quite 
different from the case of acquaintance: perhaps certain products in the sub-personal processing of 
our perceptual system can be regarded as non-accidental cognitive achievements, yet at least on 
certain notions of knowledge, they do not qualify as knowledge. Or recall Wilfrid Sellarsʼs 
influential attack on the Myth of the Given–an argument to the effect that anything that “enters the 
space of reasons” has to have a propositional format. 
These discussions require significant further commitments about the nature of knowledge, 
and itʼs possible that all things considered, there will be a proper case for a separate category of 
objectual knowledge. In this paper, I tried to show that there is no easy route to establish the 
existence of a third kind of knowledge. The linguistic format of knowledge ascriptions has little 
significance; ordinary ascriptions of knowing things indicate a number of different relations to 
things, including, in a large part of the cases, the relation of having propositional knowledge about 
the object in question. Furthermore, we cannot assume without further ado that the relations 
expressed by “knowing things” are “knowledge” in the sense that concerns epistemology. 
17
References
Balog, Katalin 2012. ʻAcquaintance and the mind-body problemʼ. In New Perspectives on Type 
Identity: The Mental and the Physical, edited by Simone Gozzano and Christopher S. Hill, 
16–42. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Benton, Matthew 2017. ʻEpistemology personalisedʼ. Philosophical Quarterly 67 (269): 813–834.
BonJour, Laurence, and Ernest Sosa 2003. Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, 
Foundations Vs. Virtues. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Brogaard, Berit 2009. ʻWhat Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-wh.ʼ Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 78: 439–467
Conee, Earl 1994. ʻPhenomenal knowledgeʼ, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2): 136–150 
Craig, Edward 1990. Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press
Crane, Tim 2012. ʻTye on Acquaintance and the Problem of Consciousnessʼ. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 84 (1):190–198.
DePoe, John M. 2013. ʻKnowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Descriptionʼ. Accessed on 
29 April 2018. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://www.iep.utm.edu/knowacq/
Fantl, Jeremy, 2016. ʻKnowledge Howʼ. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/knowledge-how/>
Farkas, Katalin 2016. ʻKnow-wh does not reduce to know thatʼ. American Philosophical Quarterly 
53(2): 109–122
Farkas, Katalin 2017. ʻPractical know-whʼ Noûs 51: 855–870.
Farkas, Katalin 2018. ʻKnow-how and non-propositional intentionalityʼ. in Non-propositional 
intentionality, edited by Alex Grzankowski and Michelle Montague, 95–113, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Hasan, Ali and Fumerton, Richard 2014. ʻKnowledge by Acquaintance vs. Descriptionʼ. The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/knowledge-acquaindescrip/>
Jackson, Frank 1982. ʻEpiphenomenal qualiaʼ. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127–136.
Martens, David B. 2010. ʻKnowledge by acquaintance/by descriptionʼ. In A companion to 
epistemology, edited by Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa and Matthias Steup, 479–82. 2nd 
edition. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Robinson, Howard M. 1982. Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Russell, Bertrand 1910. ʻKnowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by descriptionʼ. Proceedings 
of the Aristotelian Society 11(5):108–28.
Russell, Bertrand 1912. The Problems of Philosophy. London: Williams & Norgate.
Ryle, Gilbert 1949. The Concept of Mind. London, New York: Hutchinson & Co.
Stanley, Jason & Williamson, Timothy 2001. ʻKnowing howʼ. Journal of Philosophy 98: 411–444.
Stevenson, Angus (ed.) 2010. Oxford Dictionary of English. Third edition. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Tye, Michael 2009. Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Zagzebski, Linda 1999. ʻWhat Is Knowledge?ʼ. In The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, edited by
John Greco and Ernest Sosa, 92–116. Oxford: Blackwell.
18
